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Abstract: This Project examines how the retaliatory tariffs imposed by the EU in response to 
the US steel and aluminum tariffs affect EU prices and welfare over the period from June 2018 
to May 2020. Using a partial equilibrium model that assumes perfect competition, the graphical 
analysis and the regression show that the prices of the goods subject to the tariffs are fully 
passed on to EU producers and consumers, suggesting that they bear the full burden of the tariff 
increase. Consequently, the EU suffers a deadweight welfare loss of almost €144 million over 
the two years considered.  
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I Introduction  
As free trade is a main driver of economic growth and innovation (WTO 2020a), trade has been 
liberalized on the global level in recent decades. A multilateral approach to trade liberalization 
was pursued with the completion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
under which member countries grant each other reciprocal tariff reductions in regular rounds. 
Today these rounds are conducted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) (WTO 2020b). 
The creation of Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas, which completely remove tariffs 
between member countries1, and the conclusion of Preferential Trade Agreements, which 
reduce tariffs between partner countries for a set of product categories, have also contributed to 
a change in trade patterns (Suranovic 2010). Recently, efforts to liberalize trade were disrupted 
by the US when it moved to a protectionist policy of “America First”, marked by a tariff wave 
in 2018 that has a negative impact on the US itself, its trading partners and third parties (Li, He, 
and Lin 2018).  
The European Union (EU)2, in particular, was affected when the US announced the imposition 
of steel and aluminum tariffs on several trading partners. The two proclamations issued by 
President Trump on March 8, 2018, provided a 25% tariff on steel and a 10% tariff on 
aluminum, both to come into force on March 23, 2018. The White House justified this measure 
citing Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act (Executive Office of the President 2018a; 
2018b). On March 22, 2018, the President proclaimed a temporary exemption for several 
countries, including the EU, based on the condition that alternative measures had to be worked 
out until May 1 to ensure that exports from the targeted countries to the US would no longer 
pose a threat to national security (Executive Office of the President 2018c; 2018d). After 
negotiations were prolonged for another 30 days, the tariffs on steel and aluminum products 
 
1 While the members of a Custom Union agree on a common external tariff on imports from the rest of the world, 
the countries in a free trade area set an external tariff independently (Suranovic 2010).  




came into force on June 1, 2018. As a retaliatory measure, the EU imposed tariffs on US 
imports3 including steel and agricultural products on June 20, 2018. These counter tariffs can 
be extended to other products if the WTO Dispute Settlement Body declares the US’ action to 
impose tariffs as safeguard measures incompatible with WTO rules. Otherwise, the initial tariffs 
remain in place until March 23, 2021 (WTO 2018). On January 24, 2020, President Trump 
proclaimed to expand the range of products subject to the tariffs by including certain steel and 
aluminum derivatives valid from February 8, 2020 (Executive Office of the President 2020). 
The EU responded by announcing ad valorem tariffs  to come into effect on May 8, 2020 
(European Commission 2020a). At that time, its initial counter tariffs were in place for almost 
23 months.  
The EU is the world’s largest trading bloc with 27 members and maintains the most advanced 
relationship with the US in terms of bilateral trade and investment as well as economic 
integration (European Commission 2020b). The tariffs imposed on the EU as part of “America 
First” have disrupted this relationship and led to counter tariffs by the EU. Therefore, this 
Project attempts to examine the impact of those tariffs on the EU’s domestic prices, import 
volumes and aggregate economic welfare. The remainder of the Project is structured as follows. 
Section II reviews the main findings on this topic in the literature. In Section III,  the model is 
outlined. Section IV describes the data used and provides a graphical analysis of the impact of 
retaliatory tariffs on domestic prices and import values. Section V presents the empirical results 
and Section VI discusses these results including potential limitations. Finally, Section VII 
concludes and provides an outlook on future research.  
 
3 Note that from Section III onwards, the term “import” is to be understood from the perspective of EU producers 




II Literature Review  
The assumption that free trade is the best approach for countries to maximize their national 
welfare (Ricardo 1817) was discussed controversially in the literature early on. Bickerdike 
(1906), for example, argues that a country can benefit from the imposition of an optimal tariff, 
as this forces foreign suppliers to absorb a significant proportion of the costs that would 
otherwise be borne by the consumers of the country imposing the tariff. This argument is based 
on the assumption that the supply elasticity of foreign exporters is not perfectly elastic, so that 
if domestic prices of dutiable products increase and the import volumes decrease, foreign 
producers are forced to reduce their output and adjust their prices to remain competitive. As 
noted by Broda, Limão, and Weinstein (2008), countries that influence the world price when 
applying such trade policy tend to be large in international trade. This results form less elastic 
export supply curves, which give large countries more market power. Following above 
findings, a large country benefits when imposing an optimal tariff, as the gains from positive 
terms of trade will offset its total deadweight losses and thereby maximize the country’s 
national welfare. As noted by De Scitovszky (1942), this implies that the country’s trading 
partner loses from negative terms of trade and will retaliate by imposing a tariff optimal for 
itself to offset some of its losses. The two countries will end up in a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium where they are worse off compared to free trade.4 In more recent literature, the 
positive terms-of-trade argument in favor of import protection is attributed to market 
imperfections abroad rather than to the large country approach. (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) 
Irrespective of the approach, Feenstra (2004) challenges this theory by pointing out that few 
studies empirically investigate export supply elasticities. One of these few is Feenstra (1989) 
himself, who, in an attempt to answer the question of who bears the cost of a tariff, examines 
whether tariffs and exchange rates follow an identical pass-through pattern, relying on US data 
 




related to the tariff increase on Japanese motorcycles and trucks. He finds evidence of a 
symmetrical pass-through but notes that the pass-through relation varies across sectors; from 
unity for motorcycles, suggesting that the deadweight loss is fully borne by US consumers, to 
a pass-through relation of 0.58 for trucks, implying a gain for the US from positive terms of 
trade. Likewise, Irwin (2014) notes that increased tariffs are only partially passed on, meaning 
that the costs are borne by domestic consumers, but also by foreign exporters, which implies 
positive terms of trade for the tariff-imposing country.  
The imposition of protectionist tariffs by the US in 2018 has set a precedent as it is the first 
time in recent history that a large country has imposed substantial tariffs in a non-cooperative 
manner (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2020). This has led to a wave of literature attempting 
to measure the impact of these tariffs on the US itself, its trading partners and third parties, and 
on global trade. Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2019), for example, find that the prices charged 
by foreign exporters for their dutiable products to the US do not fall in the short run. This 
implies that the tariffs are passed on to the domestic prices of the dutiable goods and are fully 
borne by domestic importers in the affected sectors, who face higher input costs, and domestic 
consumers. In addition, Bellora and Fontagne (2020) point out that the increase in prices of 
dutiable goods used as intermediates by US producers has led to higher final prices for these 
goods, implying a loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign producers and thus leading to a loss 
of market share in export markets. Above findings are supported by Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), 
who measure the short-term impact of the US tariffs by estimating respective trade elasticities 
and embedding them in a general equilibrium model. Their estimation yields a loss of $51 
billion (0.27% of GDP) for US consumers and firms that purchase dutiable goods. As this loss 
is partially offset by a domestic producer surplus, resulting from a rise in domestic prices and 
an expansion of output due to the drop in demand for foreign products, and by tariff revenues 




Interestingly, all these studies find that the tariffs were passed on to the domestic prices of 
dutiable goods, while foreign prices remained unchanged. An exception is found by Amiti, 
Redding, and Weinstein (2020), who, after adding almost one year of 2019 data to their model, 
observe heterogenous behavior for the steel sector where foreign exporters have lowered their 
prices to remain competitive and thus bear almost 50% of the tariff burden. Still, this allows 
them to export a large amount of steel products to the US, providing an explanation why US 
steel production has only increased by 2% in that period (Fefer et al. 2019). This supports 
Feenstra's (1989, 20) conclusion that due to the heterogeneous behavior across products, one 
“cannot make general statements about the extent of pass through” and therefore empirical 
evidence is required for each industry.  
Another interesting finding by Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2020) is that the EU is one of 
the US trading partners that bear the bulk of the tariff burden associated with steel and 
aluminum products. This is intuitive as the EU, unlike other major trading partners, has not 
been exempted from the tariffs. In line with this, Salotti et al. (2019) et al conduct a study 
comparing how the steel and aluminum tariffs affect the base metals sector and the aggregate 
economy of the US trading partners concerned when the EU is exempt from these tariffs and 
when it is subject to them. If the latter applies, they find negative effects on the EU’s basic 
metal sector (-1.2% fall in exports), and on the EU itself (-0.039% fall in exports). From this 
finding it can be derived that import tariffs also have a negative impact on the national welfare 
of US trading partners, at least in the case of the EU. To compensate for these welfare losses, 
relevant literature argues that a trading partner considered large in international trade should 
then retaliate (Suranovic 2010). Indeed, retaliation in the form of tariffs on US imports has been 
the response of trading partners such as the EU, with negative consequences for US consumers 
and industries affected by those measures (Fefer et al. 2020). Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), for 




Wbhalley (2020), who analyze the US-China trade war, find that US welfare losses increase 
when China imposes counter tariffs. However, it should be borne in mind that retaliation harms 
trading partners in the same way as US tariffs have harmed the US, as their counter tariffs are 
passed on to domestic prices and thus to domestic consumers to the same extent (Amiti, 
Redding, and Weinstein 2019; Fajgelbaum et al. 2020). This suggests that both the initial trade 
policy and the retaliatory measure are not beneficial for either trading party involved.  
Three assumptions can be derived from recent literature. Firstly, it appears that, at least in the 
short term, tariffs on imported goods are passed on to the domestic prices of these goods in the 
tariff-imposing country, while in the longer-term, heterogeneous behavior may be observed for 
some sectors, e.g., the steel sector. Second, a pass-through of tariffs into domestic prices has a 
negative impact on the economy of the respective country and can lead to a reduction in 
aggregate economic welfare. Third, the (negative) effect on the economy of the tariff-imposing 
country is worsened by retaliatory measures taken by the trading partners concerned.  
While recent literature has focused on the impact of US tariffs and retaliation by trading partners 
on the US, major trading partners as the EU tend to be neglected in this respect. However, these 
parties may also provide valuable insights on the effect that a tariff, whether imposed as a 
safeguard or retaliatory measure, has on the tariff-imposing country. Therefore, this Project 
investigates whether the above assumptions about tariff pass-through into domestic prices and 
its impact on domestic welfare also hold in the case of the tariffs imposed by the EU in response 
to the “America First” tariffs. Specifically, using the 23-month period between the first 
imposition of tariffs in June 2018 and the second imposition in May 2020, it is analyzed whether 
the EU’s counter tariffs are fully borne by domestic producers5 and consumers, as recent 
literature suggests, and whether and to what extent this has led to a loss in aggregate economic 
welfare.  
 
5 This refers to EU producers who continue to import dutiable products from the US after the imposition of tariffs, 




III Methodology – A Conventional Trade Model  
To examine the impact of the counter tariffs on EU prices and national welfare, a partial 
equilibrium model is applied, which draws on earlier work by Feenstra (2004) and Suranovic 
(2010) in their textbooks and on work by Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019). The model  
assumes that markets are perfectly competitive, goods are homogenous (Suranovic 2010) and 
that the home country is large in international trade, which is accompanied by less elastic export 
supply curves and thus market power vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Broda, Limão, and 
Weinstein 2008). 
 
Figure 1. Initial Equilibrium under Free Trade 
 
Source: Replicated by author from Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019). 
Note: The horizontal axis shows the quantity of imported goods and the vertical axis displays 
the respective price; MDi presents the import demand curve and XSe is the export supply curve.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the initial situation in which the home country has not yet imposed a 
protective trade policy, e.g., a tariff on its foreign trading partner. Because the home country is 
large and can therefore influence the world price through changes in global supply and demand 
when applying such protective policy, it can be assumed that its trading partner is the rest of 
the world (Suranovic 2010). Since the model is initially in free trade equilibrium, the price 𝑝𝑒 




importers and consumers, so that 𝑝0
𝑒 = 𝑝0
𝑖 , as shown on the vertical axis. Accordingly, the 
quantity of goods m imported by the home country is shown on the horizontal axis. The 
equilibrium price and quantity depend on the point where the upward sloping export supply 
curve 𝑋𝑆𝑒 and the downward sloping import demand curve 𝑀𝐷𝑖  intersect. Thereby, it can be 
derived that the export supply curve rises with prices, as foreign producers seek to benefit from 
higher prices by exporting more goods and will therefore increase production. In turn, foreign 
consumer demand falls with higher prices. In the domestic market, too, consumer demand for 
a good decreases when the price rises, indicating that the import demand curve falls with prices, 
while domestic producers benefit from a higher price (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019).  
 
Figure 2. Impact of an Import Tariff on a Large Country with Inelastic Export Supply 
 
Source: Replicated by author from Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019). 
Note: The horizontal axis shows the quantity of imported goods and the vertical axis displays 
the respective price; MDi presents the import demand curve and XSe is the export supply curve.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, it is now assumed that both the export supply curve and the import 
demand curve have a constant slope. Figure 2 shows the model after the home country has 
imposed an ad valorem tariff 𝜏, which is a fixed percentage applied to the value of imported 
goods (Suranovic 2010). This shifts the export supply curve upwards, as the foreign producers 




home country. Thus, the equilibrium point under free trade disappears and the curves 
representing import demand and export supply intersect at a point further to the left and further 
up. This causes the price charged by foreign exporters to fall below its equilibrium price, so 
that 𝑝0
𝑒 > 𝑝1
𝑒, and the domestic price to rise from its equilibrium price 𝑝0
𝑖  to 𝑝1
𝑖 , which is equal 
to the export price 𝑝1
𝑒 plus the amount of the tariff 𝜏 on the price 𝑝1 
𝑒 , so that 𝑝1
𝑖 = 𝑝1
𝑒(1 + 𝜏) 
(Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). Hence, the gap between foreign and domestic price 
corresponds to the per unit tariff 𝜏. As domestic consumers face an increase in domestic prices 
of goods subject to tariff 𝜏, domestic demand for these goods decreases and shifts 𝑚0 to 𝑚1, 
indicating that less of these goods are imported (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). 
Rectangle A captures the extent of the loss due to higher prices for domestic consumers and 
triangle B illustrates their deadweight welfare loss (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). 
Together, A and B represent the total welfare loss incurred by domestic consumers due to the 
tariff, while the tariff revenue includes rectangles A and C. The welfare loss in A is thus offset 
by the tariff revenue collected in A, indicating a redistribution from domestic consumers to 
their government. In addition, the negative producer surplus of the exporting country is captured 
in rectangle C, which indicates the redistribution from foreign producers to the domestic 
government in the form of the tariff  𝜏, and in triangle B, which represents their deadweight loss 
due to fewer exports (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). Since triangle D is negligible when 
analyzing the impact of the tariff  𝜏 on the home country and A is compensated, C and B remain. 
Thus, it depends on the respective size of B and C whether the tariff 𝜏 represents a gain or a 
loss in the country's terms of trade. To obtain a gain, the country must offset the deadweight 
loss in B with the tariff revenue collected in C. Figure 2 shows that rectangle C becomes larger 
the more foreign producers lower their prices, the latter depending on the elasticity of their 
export supply curve. It applies that the steeper (less elastic) the curve is, the more export prices 




advantageous for large countries, as they have more market power due to less elastic supply 
curves and are thus more likely to induce their trading partners to lower their export prices 
(Broda, Limão, and Weinstein 2008). Accordingly, the lower the pass-through of the tariff to 
domestic consumers, the higher a country should set its (optimal) tariff (Feenstra 2004). 
 
Figure 3. The special case – Perfectly Elastic Export Supply 
 
 
Source: Replicated by author from Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019.) 
Note: The horizontal axis shows the quantity of imported goods and the vertical axis displays 
the respective price; MDi presents the import demand curve and XSe is the export supply curve.  
 
There exists a special case when the export supply curve runs horizontal. This implies perfect 
elasticity and means that foreign producers are not affected by the imposition of the tariff 𝜏 and 
therefore do not lower their prices. With C removed, the home country cannot gain from the 
tariff, as the revenue collected in A is offset by the loss incurred by the domestic consumers. 
Hence, only B is left, reflecting the deadweight welfare loss for consumers (Amiti, Redding, 
and Weinstein 2019). According to relevant literature, this case occurs when small countries 
without market power impose a tariff (Feenstra 2004). However, recent literature shows that 





IV Data – Graphical Analysis of the Tariff Increase on Prices and Quantities 
Using the catalogue of counter tariffs imposed by the EU in response to the 2018 steel and 
aluminum tariffs by the US, this section examines whether EU prices and import values change 
in line with the predictions of above model when a tariff is imposed by the home country. As 
can be derived from Appendix Table 1, this catalogue comprises 182 eight-digit product codes 
based on the Combined Nomenclature (CN), known as CN8. The CN, used by the EU to collect 
detailed trade data, is based on the international Harmonized System (HS), which groups 
products at the two- (HS2), four- (HS4) and six-digit (HS6) level according to their nature 
(Eurostat 2020). Accordingly, the individual goods in the catalogue are assigned to 17 different 
HS2 sections. Interestingly, only 106 of these goods, classified under HS2 sections 72, 73 and 
76, concern the steel and aluminum industry. Since the remaining goods belong to other 
industries and thus affect a broader range of US industries, the scope of the tariffs increases 
from an economic perspective (Fefer et al. 2020). Also, it should be noted that in the year prior 
to the tariff imposition, 2017, the products listed in the catalogue accounted for a non-negligible 
1.1% of total trade, while the HS2 sections concerned account for an average of 9.5% of total 
trade over the entire period under consideration from June 2016 to May 2020. From this 
perspective, the tariff catalog is considered appropriate for the purpose of this analysis.  
Nonetheless, it is important to consider the possibility that the time lag with which the EU 
imposed counter tariffs gave the affected industries leeway to anticipate the tariffs, allowing 
US producers to take appropriate measures to evade the tariff payments. However, this 
argument can be weakened as the EU was exempt from the tariffs until June 1, which may have 
led to a high degree of uncertainty about future counter tariffs in the industries already affected. 
Furthermore, the EU imposed counter tariff on industries that were not initially targeted and 
thus did not necessarily expect to be affected by these tariffs. Such pre-trends can be identified 




To examine the extent to which the counter tariffs are passed on to domestic prices, the prices 
paid by EU producers for US imports are considered. For this purpose, US export values and 
quantities of all CN8 product codes imported by the EU-27 and provided by Eurostat on a 
monthly basis are used. This is beneficial in that the eight-digit product codes correspond to the 
format of the products listed in the tariff catalogue and that unit values (prices) can be calculated 
for narrowly defined products (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). To obtain the unit value, 
the export value of a product is divided by its quantity. The resulting price 𝑝𝑒 is that charged 
by US exporters exclusive of tariffs. The dutiable price 𝑝𝑖 paid by EU importers is thus 
calculated by multiplying the price 𝑝𝑒 by its tariff rate, i.e. 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑒(1 + 𝜏) (Amiti, Redding, 
and Weinstein 2019). Tariffs are constructed using EU Regulation 2017/1925 (European 
Commission 2016), which provides tariff rates for all eight-digit codes in line with the WTO 
tariff rates. For dutiable products, the additional tariff rates are added to the initial tariff rates.  
 
Figure 4. Twelve-month Proportional Change in Prices Paid by EU Importers 
 
Source: Euorstat Comext (2020); European Commission (2016); author’s calculations.  
Note: 12-month proportional changes in dutiable unit values of EU imports, weighted by their 
relative importance within their product group over 12 month. Product groups are divided into 
treated products affected and untreated products not affected by the tariffs. For both series, the 




In Figure 4, the twelve-month relative change in prices paid by domestic importers is shown, 
which is appropriate for the purpose of this analysis in that seasonality can be avoided (Amiti, 
Redding, and Weinstein 2019). By denoting the price of an import good 𝑗 at time 𝑡 as 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑖 , the 
relative price change is calculated by dividing 𝑗’s unit value in 𝑡 by its unit value in 𝑡 − 12, so 
that ?̂?𝑗𝑡 
𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗𝑡 
𝑖 / 𝑝𝑗,𝑡−12
𝑖  (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). If 𝑧 denotes all goods subject to 
the new tariffs (treated products), a price index can be calculated for this category such that  
(1) ?̂?𝑧𝑡 = ∏ (?̂?𝑗𝑡
𝑖 )
𝑠𝑗
𝑗∈𝑧   
This ensures that relevant price changes are included in the price index on the basis of their 
relative importance in imports, 𝑠𝑗, which corresponds to the twelve-month logarithmic mean of 
the import share of the individual good in the share of all goods subject to the new tariffs. 
Similarly, for the goods that are not affected by the new tariffs (untreated products), a price 
index is calculated to generate a baseline scenario (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019).  
Figure 4 shows the price movements in the two years prior to the tariff increase and plots 
potential effects until May 2020. While the 0 on the horizontal axis corresponds to the month 
prior to the tariff wave, May 2018, the 0 on the vertical axis is obtained by setting the price 
index of May equal to 1 and then subtracting 1 from the price indices of May and the following 
months to express them as proportional changes (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). 
Accordingly, a price index of 0 implies that there was no price change due to the tariff increase.6  
Figure 4 provides a number of interesting findings. Looking at the period before the tariff 
imposition, the first thing that stands out is the absence of pre-trends for the treated group. Also, 
the price movements of the treated group are already more volatile than those of the untreated 
group, which move rather stable until they dip from late 2017 to May 2018. Still, it can be seen 
that the treated group is moving in the same direction as the untreated group until May 2018. 
 




After the tariff imposition, a price increase of up to 40% is observed for the treated group, while 
the movements of the untreated group remain at a comparable level as before the tariff 
imposition. This suggests that the price increase of the treated group from May 2018 is due to 
the new tariffs. That the price increase exceeds the imposed tariffs of 25% can be justified by 
the observation that the treated group continues to move in the same direction as the untreated 
group, whose price level increases by about 15%, which is thus also assumed for the treated 
group. The resulting price increase of about 25% for the treated group in the first year after the 
tariff imposition suggests that the tariffs have been fully passed on to domestic producers and 
consumers. From June 2019, the price changes of the treated group already include the 2018 
tariff increase. As the price change falls in the second year at a similar rate as it had risen the 
year before, this suggests that tariffs continue to be passed on to domestic prices to a large 
extent. Hence, the export supply curve is almost horizontal (perfectly elastic) in the two years 
following the tariff imposition, implying that foreign export prices hardly change.   
 
Figure 5. Twelve-month Proportional Change in Total Import Values 
 
Source: Euorstat Comext (2020); European Commission (2016); author’s calculations.  
Note: Distinction between 12-month proportional changes in total values of EU imports 
affected by 2018 tariff (treated) and not affected (untreated). For both series, the month before 




To also gain insight into the extent to which the quantities of imported US goods change with 
the tariff imposition, Figure 5 plots the twelve-month change in import values, for which the 
same conditions apply as in Figure 4. Again, the 0 on the horizontal axis corresponds to the 
month prior to the tariffs imposition, namely May 2018 (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). 
In contrast to Figure 4, this month’s import values are set to 1 for all goods. This ensures that 
the change in import values after the tariff imposition is expressed in relation to the change in 
import values in May 2018 (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). Once again, the treated 
group's import values in the months before the tariff introduction are more volatile than the 
import volumes of the untreated group.  
As of February 2018, a drastic increase in imports of the treated group can be observed, while 
the untreated group shows considerably less change. Since the US steel and aluminum tariffs 
were introduced in March 2018, it can be concluded that EU importers anticipated possible 
counter tariffs and stocked up on the products they needed in advance. To clarify the 
comparable import volumes of May and June 2018, note that the tariffs were imposed by the 
EU on June 20 instead of June 1, so import values did not fall immediately. In the following 
months, however, a large decline in imports of treated products, at times by more than 50%, 
can be observed. In turn, imports of untreated products increase slightly, which may be a sign 
of import substitution, as it seems likely that some of the treated products were imported via 
the untreated product group (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). Note that the drop in the 
last two months can be attributed to the Coronavirus and is therefore negligible. Furthermore, 
all petroleum imports have been removed from the graphs in Section IV and the regression 





V Set Up of the Empirical Analysis and Evaluation of the Results  
The graphical analysis in Section IV provides an insight into the impact of a tariff increase on 
dutiable prices and imported quantities of goods affected by such an increase. However, one of 
the underlying assumptions of the conventional model is that the price 𝑝𝑒 will fall after the 
imposition of new tariffs (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019), suggesting that foreign 
producers bear part of the burden resulting from the new tariff (Cf. Figure 2, Section III). 
Therefore, this section examines how the tariff increase in June 2018 has affected the price 𝑝𝑒 
charged by US exporters exclusive of tariffs. This is advantageous in that it not only provides 
evidence on whether the model’s predictions are true, but also on the course of the export supply 
curve, making it possible to estimate the impact on domestic welfare (Amiti, Redding, and 
Weinstein 2019). For a more comprehensive understanding, the impact of the tariff increase on 
import quantities and values is also investigated. Since all regression variables correspond to 
their twelve-month logarithmic changes based on the data set from Section IV over the period 
from June 2016 to May 2020, this yields the specification   
(2) Δ ln(𝑧𝑗𝑡) = 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛽Δ ln(1 + 𝜏𝑗𝑡) + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
where 𝑧𝑗𝑡 refers to each of the dependent variables, 𝜇𝑗𝑡 implies a product fixed effect and 𝜀𝑗𝑡 is 
the error term. The applied tariffs 𝜏𝑗𝑡 are defined as the independent variable, thereby affecting 
the estimated coefficient (𝛽) exogenously. By assuming that the tariffs are not correlated with 
unobserved price shocks, 𝛽 accounts for the tariff effect on the prices 𝑝𝑒 (Amiti, Redding, and 
Weinstein 2019). Again, 𝑗 refers to the goods imported from the US and 𝑡 denotes time. Note 
also that the regression controls for time and uses a difference-in-difference approach. The 
results are presented in Table 1. Column 1 estimates the effect of the twelve-month log change 
of one plus the applied tariff rate, (1 + 𝜏𝑗𝑡), on the twelve-month log change in foreign 
exporters’ prices exclusive of tariffs, corresponding to Δ ln(𝑝𝑗𝑡). The regression estimates a 




Table 1. Estimating the Impact of the EU Tariff Increase on US Imports 
  
Note: Observations include monthly data at the CN8-level from June 2016 to May 2020. 
Variables are expressed in log changes over 12 months and include a product fixed effect. The 
dependent variable is respectively the change in foreign exporters’ prices exclusive of tariffs 
(1), the change in quantities without (2) and with 0 quantities (3), and the change in import 
values exclusive of tariffs without (4) and with 0 quantities (5). Further explanations on this 
behalf can be found in the text. In columns 1 to 3, all observations whose 12-month change in 
unit values is below 1/3 or above 3 are sorted out. Standard errors are clustered in parentheses. 
Significance level: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 
 
Since the associated standard error is very low, it can be concluded that the result is precisely 
estimated and that the tariff increase thus has an immaterial impact on foreign exporter prices. 
In terms of the model, this implies that foreign exporters' prices do not fall when tariffs are 
imposed, suggesting that the exporters' supply curve is almost perfectly elastic, and the tariff 
burden is thus borne by EU importers and consumers. This is consistent with the finding of 
Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2020) that the tariff burden in most sectors is still fully borne 
by domestic importers and consumers even when these tariffs have been in place for more than 
a year. Conversely, this indicates that foreign exporters do not lower their prices even over a 
longer period of time, as usually assumed in the literature. Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 
(2020) find an exception for the steel sector, where foreign producers bear about half of the 
tariff burden after one year as they lower their prices to remain competitive. In light of the result 
in column 1, this finding is particularly interesting, as almost 60% of the goods subject to the 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log change pe
∆ln (pjt) ∆ln (mjt) ∆ln (mjt) ∆ln (pjt×mjt) ∆ln (pjt×mjt)
log change tariff 0.019 -1.892*** -1.916*** -2.390*** -2.504***
∆ln (1+τjt) (0.063) (0.158) (0.270) (0.209) (0.472)
N 204,488 204,488 238,317 289,016 345,995
R2 0.054 0.062 0.188 0.046 0.160




2018 tariffs are steel products and yet the tariff burden is still mainly borne by EU importers 
and consumers after more than one year.  
Column 2 illustrates the extent to which the independent variable affects the change in import 
quantities Δ ln(𝑚𝑗𝑡), excluding those quantities that fell to 0 in the wake of the tariff increase. 
Given that tariffs are treated as an exogenous factor and that the coefficient in column 1 
indicates that the tariff increase is exclusively borne by EU importers and consumers, the 
estimated coefficient captures the import demand elasticity, reflecting the shape of the import 
demand curve in the model (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). Consequently, a 1% increase 
in tariffs is equivalent to a 1.89% drop in import quantities, which is already fairly close to the 
decrease in import values following the imposition of counter tariffs, as shown in Figure 5  
(Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). In column 3, the regression estimating the effect on 
import quantities is repeated, including those quantities reported as 0. To adequately account 
for these quantities, the inverse hyperbolic sine, defined as ln(𝑥 + √𝑥2 + 1), is used instead of 
the logarithmic change, which is considered more appropriate when x is rather small, as it then 
replicates the slope of ln(𝑥) better than ln(1 + 𝑥) (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). It can 
be observed that the coefficient drops slightly steeper than the one estimated in column 2 and 
thus fits even better with Figure 5. Furthermore, the number of observations has increased, 
suggesting that some quantities fell to 0 after the tariff increase and thus less was imported.  
Columns 4 and 5 repeat the regressions from 2 and 3, respectively, exchanging the dependent 
variable for the twelve-month log change in import values exclusive of tariffs, so that 
Δ ln(𝑚𝑗𝑡 × 𝑝𝑗𝑡). Again, the independent variable has a stronger effect on the coefficient in 
column 5, which includes import values of 0, than on the coefficient in column 4. It is striking 
that the number of observations further increases, indicating that import quantities are reported 
less frequently than import values. As quantities are reported in units of 100 kg, one explanation 




number of observations is the reason why the coefficients in 4 and 5 fall more steeply than those 
in 2 and 3, suggesting that the difference between the coefficients is not due to a price effect.  
The estimated coefficients in columns 2 to 5 underline the finding that foreign exporters’ prices 
do not fall and thus the tariffs are fully borne by EU importers and consumers. Using the model, 
or Figure 2 and 3, and the estimated coefficients for import quantities and values obtained in 
column 3 and 5, the deadweight welfare loss (DWL) associated with the tariff increase can be 
calculated for the EU. Since a core assumption of the model is that the import demand curve is 




∗ ℎ ∗ 𝑤 is applied, where ℎ equals the dutiable price paid by EU producers, 
derived from the data, while 𝑤 represents the decrease in quantity from 𝑚0 to 𝑚1in line with 
the tariffs, captured by the coefficient 𝛽3 in column 3 of Table 1 (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 
2019). To estimate the percentage change in import quantities due to the tariff change, 𝛽3 or -
1.916 is multiplied by the log change of one plus the applied tariff rate in 𝑡 relative to one plus 
the applied tariff rate in 𝑡 − 12. 7 Over the 24-month period, this results in an average change 
in import quantities of about 63%, which is consistent with the decline in import quantities 
observed in Figure 5. To calculate the DWL per month, dutiable import values are multiplied 





𝑖 ∗ 𝑚1)𝜏𝑗𝑡𝛽3𝑙𝑛((1 + 𝜏𝑗𝑡) / (1 + 𝜏𝑗𝑡−12)) 
Summing up the monthly results over the period of twelve months, this yields the deadweight 
loss for one year (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). As shown in Table 2, this is done for 
the period from June 2018 to May 2019 and for the subsequent period. Correspondingly, the 
total DWL equals the sum of these two periods and amounts to almost € 144 million. Here, it 
is striking that the DWL in the second period is almost €23 million lower than in the first period. 
 




Table 2. Estimating the Implications for the EU’s National Welfare  
  
 
Note: DWL, tariff revenue and total cost to importers calculated over the 48-month period 
following the tariff increase. Numbers correspond to current prices in millions of euros. 
Detailed explanations on the calculations can be found in the text.  
 
The same pattern can be observed for the tariff revenue, which slumps by more than €100 
million in the second period. As this can be interpreted as a sign of tariff evasion by foreign 
exporters, it will be discussed again in the next section.  
Consistent with the above finding that foreign exporters do not lower their prices after the 
imposition of the 2018 tariffs, the tariff revenue, calculated by multiplying the total import 
values by the applied tariff rates, can be considered a pure transfer to the domestic government 
(Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). Assuming that the government uses these revenues 
completely for social purposes, the aggregate welfare loss for the EU is equal to the deadweight 
loss calculated in Table 2, or triangle B in the model. Consequently, the cost to domestic 
producers and consumers equals the sum of tariff revenue and deadweight loss, i.e., rectangle 
A plus triangle B in the model (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). These calculations are 
in line with Feenstra's (2004) social welfare equation which equals the sum of producer surplus 
and tariff revenue collected by the government and holds under both perfect and imperfect 
competition. For the sake of simplicity, note that all calculations were undertaken as if the tariffs 
had already been imposed on June 1 and not on June 20. The monthly results for DWL, tariff 









Jun 18 - May 19 83.1 398.4 481.5
Jun 19 - May 20 60.5 293.6 354.1




VI Discussion of the Results and Potential Limitations 
The regression results confirm what was already suspected in the graphical analysis, namely 
that the costs arising from the tariff increase are fully borne by domestic importers and 
consumers in the first two years, since US exporters do not lower their prices, and that this 
results in a non-negligible deadweight welfare loss for the EU. In this regard, the results are in 
line with many other studies in recent literature, e.g. Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019), 
Bouët and Laborde (2018), Cavallo et al. (2019) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2020). It must be noted, 
however, that unlike this Project, the studies cited here examine the impact of the 2018 US tariff 
wave on the US. The reason for referring to these studies is that there are hardly any studies in 
recent literature that deal with the EU's retaliatory tariffs against the US. In this context, an 
important fundamental assumption of the above mentioned studies is that the US is a large 
country, which according to Broda, Limão, and Weinstein (2008) gives a country market power 
and thus the ability to influence world prices. Since the EU can also be considered large in 
international trade, the studies are considered comparable and thus appropriate. 
Nevertheless, the question arises why a complete pass-through of tariffs to domestic prices is 
observed in the EU and also in the US, at least in the short run, despite the fact that relevant 
literature often argues that foreign exporters lower their prices and absorb part of the tariff 
burden when a (protectionist) tariff is imposed, e.g. Irwin (2014). One factor to consider could 
be that, as in Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019), a set of simplifying assumptions have been 
made that distort the impact of tariffs on prices, quantities and welfare. These assumptions 
include a model in partial equilibrium and perfect competition, although market imperfections 
may exist in reality. Also, the imposition of tariffs in June 2018 is considered an exogenous 
shock (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). Another aspect could be that the ongoing 
pandemic distorts the data analysis from March 2020 onwards by incorrectly assuming that 




pandemic. If this were the case, it could negatively affect the graphical analysis and the 
regression results, making the impact on import volumes and values and on national welfare 
appear more severe than it truly is.  
Regarding the first argument, it should be pointed out that it is reasonable to make simplifying 
assumptions, as such models would otherwise be too complex and thus incomprehensible 
(Suranovic 2010). Concerning the possible data distortion due to the pandemic, it should be 
noted that only the last three months of the observation period are affected and that the treated 
group changes only slightly compared to the untreated group, as Figure 5 shows. Accordingly, 
these limitations are considered negligible and therefore the results are suitable for analysis.  
Nevertheless, there are possible other reasons why foreign exporters do not lower their prices 
in the short run. In line with this, one argument considered by Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 
(2019) is that the prices charged by foreign exporters, in this case US exporters, may be sticky 
in the short run, so that their prices remain at the same level. However, this does not exclude 
the possibility, considered by Broda, Limão, and Weinstein (2008), that respective trade 
elasticities may change over a longer time horizon and thus prices for foreign exports may 
decline in the medium to long term. Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019) consider another 
possible reason why the prices charged by foreign exporters do not fall in the short term in the 
high degree of uncertainty that has initially accompanied the rather unexpected US tariffs. This 
suggests that foreign exporters were unwilling to lower their prices without knowing whether 
the tariffs would be short-term or longer-term in nature. As the uncertainty disappeared over a 
longer period of time, affected consumers and industries at home and abroad had the possibility 
to adjust to the new circumstances, which eventually led foreign exporters to lower their prices 
in order to remain competitive (Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein 2019). This argument can also 




In addition to the behavior of foreign export prices, the evolution of tariff revenues over the 
two years following the imposition of the tariffs is of particular interest, as the government 
revenues for the EU fall significantly by over €100 million in the second period from June 2019 
to May 2020. This finding is consistent with Fefer et al. (2019), who observe that US 
government revenues associated with US steel and aluminum tariffs decline over time, 
suggesting that trading partners affected by the tariff increase have found ways to circumvent 
the tariffs. This can therefore be seen as a sign of tariff evasion by US exporters. Such 
circumventions often lead to shifts in supply chains, e.g. exporting US products to countries 
other than the EU or to the EU via product groups not affected by the tariffs (Amiti, Redding, 
and Weinstein 2019). As Sequeira (2016) notes, it can also happen that the actual quantity of a 
dutiable product is disguised by reporting a lower quantity. Accordingly, it is very likely that 





VII Conclusion and Future Research 
This Project provides evidence that the EU retaliatory tariffs imposed in response to the US 
steel and aluminum tariffs are fully passed on to EU producers and consumers in the period 
from June 2018 to May 2020, suggesting that the tariff burden is not partially absorbed by US 
exporters. While this results in a total deadweight loss for the EU of almost €144 million, the 
total costs to EU importers exceed €830 million. Although US exporters do not charge lower 
prices in sectors affected by the retaliatory tariffs, they also suffer losses, as the import 
quantities of these products fall noticeably (Cf. Figure 5). Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019; 
2020) have found comparable results for the impact of the US tariffs on the US, except that EU 
steel and aluminum producers lowered the prices of their exports to the US one year after the 
US tariff imposition to remain competitive. As it can be concluded that both the EU and the US 
are negatively affected by the initial US tariffs on steel and aluminum and by the EU retaliatory 
tariffs, this suggests that free trade is preferable to a protectionist trade policy, at least in the 
short term.  
Depending on how long the EU counter tariffs remain in force, it is reasonable to examine the 
impact of such tariffs in the medium and also in the long term. In this respect, it will be of 
particular interest for researchers to track whether foreign exporters lower their prices in the 
medium and long term to remain competitive and to what extent the effect of a protectionist 
tariff diminishes over the years. Furthermore, this Project does not examine the impact of US 
2018 and 2020 tariffs on EU exports to the US, as Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019) have 
done vice versa for the US. Therefore, an analysis on the impact of the US tariffs on EU exports 
is also of interest for future research. Finally, the analysis of imported product varieties and 
whether its diversity decreases with the imposition of a tariff was considered outside the scope 
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IX Appendix  








07 07104000 Sweetcorn, uncooked or cooked by steaming or by boiling in 
water, frozen 25% 
07 07119030 Sweetcorn provisionally preserved, e.g. by sulphur dioxide gas, 
in brine, in sulphur water or in other preservative solutions, but 
unsuitable in that state for immediate consumption 
25% 
07 07133390 Dried, shelled kidney beans "Phaseolus vulgaris", whether or 
not skinned or split (excl. for sowing) 25% 
10 10059000 Maize (excl. seed for sowing) 25% 
10 10063021 Semi-milled round grain rice, parboiled 25% 
10 10063023 Semi-milled medium grain rice, parboiled 25% 
10 10063025 Semi-milled long grain rice, length-width ratio > 2 but < 3, 
parboiled 25% 
10 10063027 Semi-milled long grain rice, length-width ratio >= 3, parboiled 25% 
10 10063042 Semi-milled round grain rice (excl. parboiled) 25% 
10 10063044 Semi-milled medium grain rice (excl. parboiled) 25% 
10 10063046 Semi-milled long grain rice, length-width ratio > 2 but < 3 
(excl. parboiled) 25% 
10 10063048 Semi-milled long grain rice, length-width ratio >= 3 (excl. 
parboiled) 25% 
10 10063061 Wholly milled round grain rice, parboiled, whether or not 
polished or glazed 25% 
10 10063063 Wholly milled medium grain rice, parboiled, whether or not 
polished or glazed 25% 
10 10063065 Wholly milled long grain rice, length-width ratio > 2 but < 3, 
parboiled, whether or not polished or glazed 25% 
10 10063067 Wholly milled long grain rice, length-width ratio >= 3, 
parboiled, whether or not polished or glazed 25% 
10 10063092 Wholly milled round grain rice, whether or not polished or 
glazed (excl. parboiled) 25% 
10 10063094 Wholly milled medium grain rice, whether or not polished or 
glazed (excl. parboiled) 25% 
10 10063096 Wholly milled long grain rice, length-width > 2 but < 3, 
whether or not polished or glazed (excl. parboiled) 25% 
10 10063098 Wholly milled long grain rice, length-width ratio >= 3, whether 
or not polished or glazed (excl. parboiled) 25% 
10 10064000 Broken rice 25% 
19 19041030 Prepared foods obtained by swelling or roasting cereals or 
cereal products based on rice 25% 
19 19049010 Rice, pre-cooked or otherwise prepared, n.e.s. (excl. flour, 
groats and meal, food preparations obtained by swelling or 
roasting or from unroasted cereal flakes or from mixtures of 
unroasted cereal flakes and roasted cereal flakes or swelled 
cereals) 
25% 
20 20019030 Sweetcorn "Zea Mays var. Saccharata", prepared or preserved 
by vinegar or acetic acid 25% 
20 20049010 Sweetcorn "Zea Mays var. Zaccharata", prepared or preserved 
otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, frozen 25% 
20 20058000 Sweetcorn "Zea Mays var. Saccharata", prepared or preserved 
otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid (excl. frozen) 25% 
20 20081110 Peanut butter 25% 
20 20091200 Orange juice, unfermented, Brix value <= 20 at 20°C, whether 
or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter 
(excl. containing spirit and frozen) 
25% 
20 20091911 Orange juice, unfermented, Brix value > 67 at 20°C, value of 
<= 30 € per 100 kg, whether or not containing added sugar or 





20 20091919 Orange juice, unfermented, Brix value > 67 at 20°C, value of > 
30 €  per 100 kg, whether or not containing added sugar or 
other sweetening matter (excl. containing spirit and frozen) 
25% 
20 20091991 Orange juice, unfermented, Brix value > 20 but <= 67 at 20°C, 
value of <= 30 €  per 100 kg, containing > 30% added sugar 
(excl. containing spirit and frozen) 
25% 
20 20091998 Orange juice, unfermented, Brix value > 20 but <= 67 at 20°C, 
whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening 
matter (excl. containing spirit and frozen, with a value of <= 30 
€  per 100 kg and with > 30% added sugar) 
25% 
20 20098111 Cranberry "Vaccinium macrocarpon, Vaccinium oxycoccos, 
Vaccinium vitis- idaea" juice, unfermented, whether or not 
containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, Brix value 
> 67 at 20°C, value of <= € 30 per 100 kg (excl. containing 
spirit) 
25% 
20 20098119 Cranberry "Vaccinium macrocarpon, Vaccinium oxycoccos, 
Vaccinium vitis- idaea" juice, unfermented, whether or not 
containing added sugar or other sweetening matter, Brix value 
> 67 at 20°C, value of > € 30 per 100 kg (excl. containing 
spirit) 
25% 
20 20098131 Cranberry "Vaccinium macrocarpon, Vaccinium oxycoccos, 
Vaccinium vitis- idaea" juice, unfermented, Brix value <= 67 at 
20°C, value of > € 30 per 100 kg, containing added sugar 
(excl. containing spirit) 
25% 
20 20098159 Cranberry "Vaccinium macrocarpon, Vaccinium oxycoccos, 
Vaccinium vitis- idaea" juice, unfermented, Brix value <= 67 at 
20°C, value of <=  € 30  per 100 kg, containing <= 30% added 
sugar (excl. containing spirit) 
25% 
20 20098195 Juice of fruit of the species Vaccinium macrocarpon, 
unfermented, Brix value 
<= 67 at 20°C (excl. containing added sugar or spirit) 
25% 
20 20098199 Cranberry "Vaccinium oxycoccos, Vaccinium vitis-idaea" juice, 
unfermented, Brix value <= 67 at 20°C (excl. containing spirit 
or added sugar) 
25% 
22 22083011 Bourbon whiskey, in containers holding <= 2 l 25% 
22 22083019 Bourbon whiskey, in containers holding > 2 l 25% 
22 22083082 Whisky, in containers holding <= 2 l (other than Bourbon 
whiskey and Scotch whisky) 25% 
22 22083088 Whisky, in containers holding > 2 l (other than Bourbon 
whiskey and Scotch whisky) 25% 
24 24021000 Cigars, cheroots and cigarillos containing tobacco 25% 
24 24022010 Cigarettes, containing tobacco and cloves 25% 
24 24022090 Cigarettes, containing tobacco (excl. containing cloves) 25% 
24 24029000 Cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes consisting wholly of 
tobacco substitutes 25% 
24 24031100 Water-pipe tobacco (excl. tobacco-free. See subheading note 
1.) 25% 
24 24031910 Smoking tobacco, whether or not containing tobacco 
substitutes in any proportion, in immediate packings of a net 
content of <= 500 g (excl. water- pipe tobacco containing 
tobacco) 
25% 
24 24031990 Smoking tobacco, whether or not containing tobacco 
substitutes in any proportion, in immediate packings of a net 
content of > 500 g (excl. water- pipe tobacco containing 
tobacco) 
25% 
24 24039100 Tobacco, "homogenised" or "reconstituted" from finely-chopped 
tobacco leaves, tobacco refuse or tobacco dust 25% 
24 24039910 Chewing tobacco and snuff 25% 
24 24039990 Manufactured tobacco and tobacco substitutes, and tobacco 
powder, tobacco extracts and essences (excl. chewing tobacco, 
snuff, cigars, cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes, smoking 
tobacco whether or not containing tobacco substitutes in any 
proportion, "homogenised" or "reconstituted" tobacco, nicotine 
extracted from the tobacco plant and insecticides manufactured 
from tobacco extracts and essences) 
25% 




33 33043000 Manicure or pedicure preparations 25% 
33 33049100 Make-up or skin care powders, incl. baby powders, whether or 
not compressed (excl. medicaments) 25% 
61 61091000 T-shirts, singlets and other vests of cotton, knitted or crocheted 25% 
61 61099020 T-shirts, singlets and other vests of wool or fine animal hair or 
man-made fibres, knitted or crocheted 25% 
61 61099090 T-shirts, singlets and other vests of textile materials, knitted or 
crocheted (excl. of wool, fine animal hair, cotton or man-made 
fibres) 
25% 
62 62034231 Men's or boys' trousers and breeches of cotton denim (excl. 
knitted or crocheted, industrial and occupational, bib and brace 
overalls and underpants) 
25% 
62 62034290 Men's or boys' shorts of cotton (excl. knitted or crocheted, 
swimwear and underpants) 25% 
62 62034311 Men's or boys' trousers and breeches of synthetic fibres, 
industrial and occupational (excl. knitted or crocheted and bib 
and brace overalls) 
25% 
62 62046231 Women's or girls' cotton denim trousers and breeches (excl. 
industrial and occupational, bib and brace overalls and panties) 25% 
62 62046290 Women's or girls' cotton shorts (excl. knitted or crocheted, 
panties and swimwear) 25% 
63 63023100 Bedlinen of cotton (excl. printed, knitted or crocheted) 25% 
64 64035995 Men's footwear with outer soles and uppers of leather, with in-
soles of >= 24 cm in length (excl. covering the ankle, 
incorporating a protective metal toecap, made on a base or 
platform of wood, without in-soles, with a vamp or upper made 
of straps, indoor footwear, sports footwear, and orthopaedic 
footwear) 
25% 
72 72101220 Tinplate of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width of >= 600 mm 
and of a thickness of < 0,5 mm, tinned [coated with a layer of 
metal containing, by weight, >= 97% of tin], not further 
worked than surface-treated 
25% 
72 72101280 Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width of >= 
600 mm, hot- rolled or cold-rolled "cold-reduced", plated or 
coated with tin, of a thickness of 
< 0,5 mm (excl. tinplate) 
25% 
72 72191210 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 
mm, not further worked than hot-rolled, in coils, of a thickness 
of >= 4,75 mm but <= 10 mm, containing by weight >= 2,5 
nickel 
25% 
72 72191290 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 
mm, not further worked than hot-rolled, in coils, of a thickness 
of >= 4,75 mm but <= 10 mm, containing by weight < 2,5 
nickel 
25% 
72 72191310 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 
mm, not further worked than hot-rolled, in coils, of a thickness 
of >= 3 mm but <= 4,75 mm, containing by weight >= 2,5 
nickel 
25% 
72 72191390 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 
mm, not further worked than hot-rolled, in coils, of a thickness 
of >= 3 mm but <= 4,75 mm, containing by weight < 2,5 
nickel 
25% 
72 72193210 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 
mm, not further worked than cold-rolled "cold-reduced", of a 
thickness of >= 3 mm but <= 4,75 mm, containing by weight 
>= 2,5% nickel 
25% 
72 72193290 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 
mm, not further worked than cold-rolled "cold-reduced", of a 
thickness of >= 3 mm but <= 4,75 mm, containing by weight 
< 2,5% nickel 
25% 
72 72193310 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 
mm, not further worked than cold-rolled "cold-reduced", of a 
thickness of > 1 mm but < 3 mm, containing by weight >= 
2,5% nickel 
25% 
72 72193390 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 





thickness of > 1 mm but < 3 mm, containing by weight < 2,5% 
nickel 
72 72193410 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 
mm, not further worked than cold-rolled "cold-reduced", of a 
thickness of >= 0,5 mm but <= 1 mm, containing by weight 
>= 2,5% nickel 
25% 
72 72193490 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 
mm, not further worked than cold-rolled "cold-reduced", of a 
thickness of >= 0,5 mm but <= 1 mm, containing by weight < 
2,5% nickel 
25% 
72 72193590 Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of >= 600 
mm, not further worked than cold-rolled "cold-reduced", of a 
thickness of < 0,5 mm, containing by weight < 2,5% nickel 
25% 
72 72222021 Bars and rods of stainless steel, not further worked than cold-
formed or cold- finished, of circular cross-section measuring >= 
25 mm but < 80 mm and containing by weight >= 2,5% nickel 
25% 
72 72222029 Bars and rods of stainless steel, not further worked than cold-
formed or cold- finished, of circular cross-section measuring >= 
25 mm but < 80 mm and containing by weight < 2,5% nickel 
25% 
72 72222031 Bars and rods of stainless steel, not further worked than cold-
formed or cold- finished, of circular cross-section measuring < 
25 mm and containing by weight >= 2,5% nickel 
25% 
72 72222081 Bars and rods of stainless steel, not further worked than cold-
formed or cold- finished, containing by weight >= 2,5% nickel 
(excl. such products of circular cross-section) 
25% 
72 72222089 Bars and rods of stainless steel, not further worked than cold-
formed or cold- finished, containing by weight < 2,5% nickel 
(excl. such products of circular cross-section) 
25% 
72 72224010 Angles, shapes and sections of stainless steel, only hot-rolled, 
only hot-drawn or only extruded 25% 
72 72224050 Angles, shapes and sections of stainless steel, not further 
worked than cold- formed or cold-finished 25% 
72 72224090 Angles, shapes and sections of stainless steel, cold-formed or 
cold-finished and further worked, or not further worked than 
forged, or forged, or hot- formed by other means and further 
worked, n.e.s. 
25% 
72 72230011 Wire of stainless steel, in coils, containing by weight 28% to 
31% nickel and 20% to 22% chromium (excl. bars and rods) 25% 
72 72230019 Wire of stainless steel, in coils, containing by weight >= 2,5% 
nickel (excl. such products containing 28% to 31% nickel and 
20% to 22% chromium, and bars and rods) 
25% 
72 72230091 Wire of stainless steel, in coils, containing by weight < 2,5% 
nickel, 13% to 25% chromium and 3,5% to 6% aluminium 
(excl. bars and rods) 
25% 
72 72269200 Flat-rolled products of alloy steel other than stainless, of a 
width of < 600 mm, not further worked than cold-rolled "cold-
reduced" (excl. products of high-speed steel or silicon-electrical 
steel) 
25% 
72 72283020 Bars and rods of tool steel, only hot-rolled, only hot-drawn or 
only extruded (excl. semi-finished products, flat-rolled products 
and hot-rolled bars and rods in irregularly wound coils) 
25% 
72 72283041 Bars and rods of steel containing by weight 0,9 to 1,15% of 
carbon and 0,5 to 2% of chromium, and, if present, <= 0,5% 
of molybdenum, only hot-rolled, hot-drawn or hot-extruded, of 
a circular cross-section of a diameter of >= 80 mm (excl. semi-
finished products, flat-rolled products and hot-rolled bars and 
rods in irregularly wound coils) 
25% 
72 72283049 Bars and rods of steel containing by weight 0,9 to 1,15% of 
carbon and 0,5 to 2% of chromium, and, if present, <= 0,5% 
of molybdenum, only hot-rolled, only hot-drawn or hot-
extruded (other than of circular cross-section, of a diameter of 
>= 80 mm and excl. semi-finished products, flat-rolled 
products and hot-rolled bars and rods in irregularly wound 
coils) 
25% 
72 72283061 Bars and rods of alloy steel other than stainless steel, only hot-





a diameter of >= 80 mm (other than of high-speed steel, silico-
manganese steel, tool steel, articles of subheading 7228.30.41  
and excl. semi-finished products, flat-rolled products and hot-
rolled bars and rods in irregularly wound coils) 
72 72283069 Bars and rods or alloy steel other than stainless steel, only hot-
rolled, hot- drawn or hot-extruded, of circular cross-section, of 
a diameter of < 80 mm (other than of high-speed steel, silico-
manganese steel, tool steel and articles of subheading 
7228.30.49 and excl. semi-finished products, flat-rolled 
products and hot-rolled bars and rods in irregularly wound 
coils) 
25% 
72 72283070 Bars and rods of alloy steel other than stainless steel, of 
rectangular "other than square" cross-section, hot-rolled on 
four faces (other than of high-speed steel, silico-manganese 
steel, tool steel, articles of subheading 7228.30.41 and 
7228.30.49 and excl. semi-finished products, flat-rolled 
products and hot-rolled bars and rods in irregularly wound 
coils) 
25% 
72 72283089 Bars and rods of alloy steel other than stainless steel, only hot-
rolled, hot- drawn or hot-extruded, of other than rectangular 
[other than square] cross- section, rolled on four faces, or of 
circular cross-section (other than of high- speed steel, silico-
manganese steel, tool steel, articles of subheading 7228.30.49 
and excl. semi-finished products, flat-rolled products and hot- 
rolled bars and rods in irregularly wound coils) 
25% 
72 72285020 Bars and rods of tool steel, only cold-formed or cold-finished 
(excl. semi- finished products, flat-rolled products and hot-
rolled bars and rods in irregularly wound coils) 
25% 
72 72285040 Bars and rods of steel containing 0,9% to 1,15% of carbon, 
0,5% to 2% of chromium and, if present <= 0,5% of 
molybdenum, only cold-formed or cold- finished (excl. semi-
finished products, flat-rolled products and hot-rolled bars and 
rods in irregularly wound coils) 
25% 
72 72285069 Bars and rods of alloy steel, other than stainless steel, not 
further worked  than cold-formed or cold-finished, of circular 
cross-section, of a diameter of < 80 mm (excl. of high-speed 
steel, silico-manganese steel, tool steel, articles of subheading 
7228.50.40, semi-finished products, flat-rolled products and 
hot- rolled bars and rods in irregularly wound coils) 
25% 
72 72285080 Bars and rods of alloy steel, other than stainless steel, not 
further worked than cold-formed or cold-finished (excl. of 
circular cross-section and products of high-speed steel, silico-
manganese steel, tool steel, articles of subheading 7228.50.40, 
semi-finished products, flat-rolled products and hot-rolled bars 
and rods in irregularly wound coils) 
25% 
72 72299020 Wire of high-speed steel, in coils (excl. bars and rods) 25% 
72 72299050 Wire of steel containing by weight 0,9% to 1,1% of carbon, 
0,5% to 2% of chromium and, if present, <= 0,5% of 
molybdenum, in coils (excl. rolled bars and rods) 
25% 
72 72299090 Wire of alloy steel other than stainless, in coils (excl. rolled bars 
and rods, wire of high-speed steel or silico-manganese steel 
and articles of subheading 7229.90.50) 
25% 
73 73012000 Angles, shapes and sections, of iron or steel, welded 25% 
73 73043120 Precision tubes, seamless, of circular cross-section, of iron or 
non-alloy steel, cold-drawn or cold-rolled "cold-reduced" (excl. 
line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines or casing and 
tubing of a kind used for drilling for oil or gas) 
25% 
73 73043180 Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, seamless, of circular cross-
section, of iron or non-alloy steel, cold-drawn or cold-rolled 
"cold-reduced" (excl. cast iron products, line pipe of a kind used 
for oil or gas pipelines, casing and tubing of a kind used for 
drilling for oil or gas and precision tubes) 
25% 
73 73044100 Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, seamless, of circular cross-
section, of stainless steel, cold-drawn or cold-rolled "cold-
reduced" (excl. line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, 





73 73063011 Precision tubes, welded, of circular cross-section, of iron or 
non-alloy steel, with a wall thickness of <= 2 mm 25% 
73 73063019 Precision tubes, welded, of circular cross-section, of iron or 
non-alloy steel, with a wall thickness of > 2 mm 25% 
73 73063041 Threaded or threadable tubes "gas pipe", welded, of circular 
cross-section, of iron or non-alloy steel, plated or coated with 
zinc 
25% 
73 73063049 Threaded or threadable tubes "gas pipe", welded, of circular 
cross-section, of iron or non-alloy steel (excl. products plated or 
coated with zinc) 
25% 
73 73063072 Other tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, welded, of circular 
cross-section, of iron or non-alloy steel, of an external diameter 
of <= 168,3 mm, plated or coated with zinc (excl. line pipe of a 
kind used for oil or gas pipelines or casing and tubing of a kind 
used in drilling for oil or gas) 
25% 
73 73063077 Other tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, welded, of circular 
cross-section, of iron or non-alloy steel of an external diameter 
of <= 168,3 mm (excl. plated or coated with zinc and line pipe 
of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines, casing and tubing of a 
kind used in drilling for oil or gas, precision tubes and threaded 
or threadable tubes "gas pipe") 
25% 
73 73063080 Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, welded, having a circular 
cross-section, of iron or steel, of an external diameter of > 
168,3 mm but <= 406,4 mm (excl. line pipe of a kind used for 
oil or gas pipelines or casing and tubing of a kind used in 
drilling for oil or gas, or precision steel tubes, electrical conduit 
tubes or threaded or threadable tubes "gas pipe") 
25% 
73 73064020 Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, welded, of circular cross-
section, of stainless steel, cold-drawn or cold-rolled "cold-
reduced" (excl. products having internal and external circular 
cross-sections and an external diameter of > 406,4 mm, and 
line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines or casing and 
tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas) 
25% 
73 73064080 Tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, welded, of circular cross-
section, of stainless steel (excl. products cold-drawn or cold-
rolled "cold-reduced", tubes and pipes having internal and 
external circular cross-sections and an external diameter of > 
406,4 mm, and line pipe of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines 
or casing and tubing of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas) 
25% 
73 73071110 Tube or pipe fittings of non-malleable cast iron, of a kind used 
in pressure systems 25% 
73 73071190 Tube or pipe fittings of non-malleable cast iron (excl. products 
of a kind used in pressure systems) 25% 
73 73071910 Tube or pipe fittings of malleable cast iron 25% 
73 73071990 Cast tube or pipe fittings of steel 25% 
73 73083000 Doors, windows and their frames and thresholds for doors, of 
iron or steel 25% 
73 73084000 Equipment for scaffolding, shuttering, propping or pit-propping 
(excl. composite sheetpiling products and formwork panels for 
poured-in-place concrete, which have the characteristics of 
moulds) 
25% 
73 73089051 Panels comprising two walls of profiled "ribbed" sheet, of iron or 
steel, with an insulating core 25% 
73 73089059 Structures and parts of structures, of iron or steel, solely or 
principally of sheet, n.e.s. (excl. doors and windows and their 
frames, and panels comprising two walls of profiled "ribbed" 
sheet, of iron or steel, with an insulating core) 
25% 
73 73089098 Structures and parts of structures of iron or steel, n.e.s. (excl. 
bridges and bridge-sections; towers; lattice masts; doors, 
windows and their frames and thresholds; equipment for 
scaffolding, shuttering, propping or pit-propping, and products 
made principally of sheet) 
25% 
73 73090010 Reservoirs, tanks, vats and similar containers, of iron or steel, 
for gases other than compressed or liquefied gas, of a capacity 





equipment and containers specifically constructed or equipped 
for one or more types of transport) 
73 73090051 Reservoirs, tanks, vats and similar containers, of iron or steel, 
for liquids, of a capacity of > 100.000  l (excl. containers lined 
or heat-insulated or fitted with mechanical or thermal 
equipment and containers specifically constructed or equipped 
for one or more types of transport) 
25% 
73 73090059 Reservoirs, tanks, vats and similar containers, of iron or steel, 
for liquids, of a capacity of <= 100.000 l but > 300  l (excl. 
containers lined or heat-insulated or fitted with mechanical or 
thermal equipment and containers specifically constructed or 
equipped for one or more types of transport) 
25% 
73 73102910 Tanks, casks, drums, cans, boxes and similar containers, of iron 
or steel, for any material, of a capacity of < 50 l and of a wall 
thickness of < 0,5 mm, 
n.e.s. (excl. containers for compressed or liquefied gas, or 
containers fitted 
with mechanical or thermal equipment, and cans which are to 
be closed by soldering or crimping) 
25% 
73 73102990 Tanks, casks, drums, cans, boxes and similar containers, of iron 
or steel, for any material, of a capacity of < 50 l and of a wall 
thickness of >= 0,5 mm, 
n.e.s. (excl. containers for compressed or liquefied gas, or 
containers fitted with mechanical or thermal equipment, and 
cans which are to be closed by soldering or crimping) 
25% 
73 73110013 Containers of iron or steel, seamless, for compressed or 
liquefied gas, for a pressure >=165bar, of a capacity >=20 l to 
<=50 l (excl. containers specifically constructed or equipped for 
one or more types of transport) 
25% 
73 73110019 Containers of iron or steel, seamless, for compressed or 
liquefied gas, for a pressure >=165bar, of a capacity >50 l 
(excl. containers specifically constructed or equipped for one or 
more types of transport)  
25% 
73 73110099 Containers of iron or steel, seamless, for compressed or 
liquefied gas, of a capacity of >= 1.000  l (excl. seamless 
containers and containers specifically constructed or equipped 
for one or more types of transport) 
25% 
73 73141400 Woven cloth, incl. endless bands, of stainless steel wire (excl. 
woven products of metal fibres of a kind used for cladding, 
lining or similar purposes and endless bands for machinery) 
25% 
73 73141900 Woven cloth, incl. endless bands, of iron or steel wire (excl. 
stainless and woven products of metal fibres of a kind used for 
cladding, lining or similar purposes) 
25% 
73 73144900 Grill, netting and fencing, of iron or steel wire, not welded at 
the intersection (excl. plated or coated with zinc or coated with 
plastics) 
25% 
73 73151110 Roller chain of iron or steel, of a kind used for cycles and 
motorcycles 25% 
73 73151190 Roller chain of iron or steel (excl. roller chain of a kind used for 
cycles and motorcycles) 25% 
73 73151200 Articulated link chain of iron or steel (excl. roller chain) 25% 
73 73151900 Parts of articulated link chain, of iron or steel 25% 
73 73158900 Chain of iron or steel (excl. articulated link chain, skid chain, 
stud-link chain, welded link chain and parts thereof; watch 
chains, necklace chains and the like, cutting and saw chain, 
skid chain, scraper chain for conveyors, toothed chain for 
textile machinery and the like, safety devices with chains for 
securing doors, and measuring chains) 
25% 
73 73159000 Parts of skid chain, stud-link chain and other chains of heading 
7315 (excl. articulated link chain) 25% 
73 73181410 Self-tapping screws, of iron or steel other than stainless (excl. 
wook screws) 25% 
73 73181491 Spaced-thread screws of iron or steel other than stainless 25% 
73 73181499 Self-tapping screws of iron or steel other than stainless (excl. 
spaced-thread screws and wood screws) 25% 




73 73181660 Self-locking nuts of iron or steel other than stainless 25% 
73 73181692 Nuts of iron or steel other than stainless, with an inside 
diameter <= 12 mm (excl. blind rivet nuts and self-locking 
nuts) 
25% 
73 73181699 Nuts of iron or steel other than stainless, with an inside 
diameter > 12 mm (excl. blind rivet nuts and self-locking nuts) 25% 
73 73211110 Appliances for baking, frying, grilling and cooking with oven, 
incl. separate ovens, for domestic use, of iron or steel, for gas 
fuel or for both gas and other fuels (excl. large cooking 
appliances) 
25% 
73 73211190 Appliances for baking, frying, grilling and cooking and plate 
warmers, for domestic use, of iron or steel, for gas fuel or for 
both gas and other fuels (excl. cooking appliances with oven, 
separate ovens and large cooking appliances) 
25% 
73 73229000 Air heaters and hot-air distributors, incl. distributors which can 
also distribute fresh or conditioned air, non-electrically heated, 
incorporating a motor-driven fan or blower, and parts thereof, 
of iron or steel 
25% 
73 73239300 Table, kitchen or other household articles, and parts thereof, of 
stainless steel (excl. cans, boxes and similar containers of 
heading 7310; waste baskets; shovels, corkscrews and other 
articles of the nature of a work implement; articles of cutlery, 
spoons, ladles, forks etc. of heading 8211 to 8215; ornamental 
articles; sanitary ware) 
25% 
73 73239900 Table, kitchen or other household articles, and parts thereof, of 
iron other than cast iron or steel other than stainless (excl. 
enamelled articles; cans, boxes and similar containers of 
heading 7310; waste baskets; shovels and other articles of the 
nature of a work implement; cutlery, spoons, ladles etc. of 
heading 8211 to 8215; ornamental articles; sanitary ware) 
25% 
73 73241000 Sinks and washbasins, of stainless steel 25% 
73 73251000 Articles of non-malleable cast iron, n.e.s. 25% 
73 73259910 Articles of malleable cast iron, n.e.s. (excl. grinding balls and 
similar articles for mills) 25% 
73 73259990 Articles of iron or steel, cast, n.e.s. (excl. of malleable or non-
malleable cast iron, grinding balls and similar articles for mills) 25% 
73 73269030 Ladders and steps, of iron or steel 25% 
73 73269040 Pallets and similar platforms for handling goods, of iron or steel 25% 
73 73269050 Reels for cables, piping and the like, of iron or steel 25% 
73 73269060 Ventilators, non-mechanical, guttering, hooks and like articles 
used in the building industry, n.e.s., of iron or steel 25% 
73 73269092 Articles of iron or steel, open-die forged, n.e.s. 25% 
73 73269096 Sintered articles of iron or steel, n.e.s. 25% 
76 76061110 Plates, sheets and strip, of non-alloy aluminium, of a thickness 
of > 0,2 mm, square or rectangular, painted, varnished or 
coated with plastics 
25% 
76 76061191 Plates, sheets and strip, of non-alloy aluminium, of a thickness 
of > 0,2 mm but < 3 mm, square or rectangular (excl. such 
products painted, varnished or coated with plastics, and 
expanded plates, sheets and strip) 
25% 
76 76061220 Plates, sheets and strip, of aluminium alloys, of a thickness of 
> 0,2 mm, square or rectangular, painted, varnished or coated 
with plastics 
25% 
76 76061292 Plates, sheets and strip, of aluminium alloys, of a thickness of 
> 0,2 mm but 
< 3 mm, square or rectangular (excl. painted, varnished or 
coated with plastics, expanded plates, sheets and strip) 
25% 
76 76061293 Plates, sheets and strip, of aluminium alloys, of a thickness of 
>= 3 mm but < 6 mm, square or rectangular (excl. such 
products painted, varnished or coated with plastics) 
25% 
87 87114000 Motorcycles, incl. mopeds, with reciprocating internal 
combustion piston engine of a cylinder capacity > 500 cm³ but 
<= 800 cm³ 
25% 
87 87115000 Motorcycles, incl. mopeds, with reciprocating internal 




89 89039110 Sea-going sailboats and yachts, with or without auxiliary motor, 
for pleasure or sports 25% 
89 89039190 Sailboats and yachts, with or without auxiliary motor, for 
pleasure or sports (excl. seagoing vessels) 25% 
89 89039210 Sea-going motor boats and motor yachts, for pleasure or sports 
(other than outboard motor boats) 25% 
89 89039291 Motor boats for pleasure or sports, of a length <= 7,5 m (other 
than outboard motor boats) 25% 
89 89039299 Motor boats for pleasure or sports, of a length > 7,5 m (other 
than outboard motor boats and excl. seagoing motor boats) 25% 
89 89039910 Vessels for pleasure or sports, rowing boats and canoes, of a 
weight <= 100 kg each (excl. motor boats powered other than 
by outboard motors, sailboats with or without auxiliary motor 
and inflatable boats) 
25% 
89 89039991 Vessels for pleasure or sports, rowing boats and canoes, of a 
weight > 100 kg, of a length <= 7,5 m (excl. motor boats 
powered other than by outboard motors, sailboats with or 
without auxiliary motor and inflatable boats) 
25% 
89 89039999 Vessels for pleasure or sports , rowing boats and canoes, of a 
weight > 100 kg, of a length > 7,5 m (excl. motor boats and 
motor yachts powered other than by outboard motors, sailboats 
and yachts with or without auxiliary motor and inflatable boats) 
25% 























Table 2. Monthly Results for DWL, Tariff Revenue and Total Cost to Importers 
 
 
Note: Monthly figures for DWL, tariff revenue and total cost to importers calculated over the 
48-month period following the tariff increase. Numbers correspond to current prices in millions 
of euros. Detailed explanations on the calculations can be found in the text. 
 
Month Deadweight Loss Tariff Revenue Total Cost Importers
May-18 0 0 0
Jun-18 14.1 66.9 81.0
Jul-18 8.8 42.0 50.9
Aug-18 5.7 27.3 33.0
Sep-18 5.4 25.8 31.1
Oct-18 6.3 30.6 36.9
Nov-18 6.0 28.5 34.5
Dec-18 4.0 19.2 23.2
Jan-19 4.9 23.9 28.8
Feb-19 5.3 25.5 30.8
Mar-19 7.8 37.5 45.4
Apr-19 6.6 31.8 38.4
May-19 8.1 39.4 47.5
Total FY1 83.1 398.4 481.5
Jun-19 7.5 36.1 43.5
Jul-19 5.4 26.4 31.9
Aug-19 4.6 22.6 27.2
Sep-19 5.1 24.6 29.7
Oct-19 6.1 29.4 35.5
Nov-19 4.8 23.1 27.9
Dec-19 4.1 20.1 24.2
Jan-20 4.7 22.8 27.5
Feb-20 4.6 22.3 26.9
Mar-20 5.4 26.4 31.8
Apr-20 4.6 22.4 27.0
May-20 3.6 17.3 20.9
Total FY2 60.5 293.6 354.1
Total 143.6 692.0 835.6                         
